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Abstract
We allow for heterogeneity in investors’ ability to borrow from collateral in a Kiyotaki-
Moore style macro model. We calibrate the model to match the quintiles of the distri-
bution of leverage ratios of US non-financial firms. We show that financial amplification
of the model with heterogeneous investors can be orders of magnitude higher, because of
more pronounced asset price reactions.
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1 Introduction
We present an extension of a core macroeconomic model with financial frictions to account for
heterogeneity in investors’ ability to borrow from collateral. The literature leading this field,
both the seminal contributions of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999), but
also the large literature thereafter1, retains a high degree of aggregation: there typically exists
a representative financially-constrained agent, and our existing models are typically calibrated
to match an economy-wide average of leverage ratios. In the data, observed leverage ratios
(assets to net worth) of US non-financial firms are, on average, at around 1.5 to 2 (see, e.g.
CGFS (2009)), with wide cross-sectional variation. Leverage ratios of financial intermediators
are substantially higher.2
We take the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and, instead of a representative
investor, introduce different investor types that each can manage different types of capital,
which are collateralizable to different degrees. We calibrate the model to match the observed
leverage ratios of the quintiles of the distribution of leverage ratios for US non-financial firms,
using the dataset of Rauh and Sufi (2010). We find that the model with heterogeneous in-
vestors produces a much more pronounced financial amplification of shocks compared to a
model version where collateral constraint parameters are calibrated to the economy-wide av-
erage (homogeneous investors). This is because investors with the highest leverage are the
drivers of asset prices, not the economy wide average. Asset price drops in response to neg-
ative productivity shocks are therefore much stronger in the heterogeneous investors model,
tightening the financial constraints of all investors, and leading to additional amplification.
2 The model
The model economy is populated by a representative saver (patient), investors (impatient),
and a representative firm. Investors borrow from savers to invest in capital; they each man-
age a specific type of capital, which they rent to firms for use in production, and which is
collateralizable to different degrees. For simplicity, we assume labor supply and the investors’
types of capital are in fixed supply.
2.1 Investors
There is a continuum of investors, with measure 1. Investors come in I different types, each
investor i’s size is given by ni, where
∑
i ni = 1. Preferences of investor i, for i = 1, .., I, are:
Et
∞∑
s=t
(
βIi
)s
(
CIit
)1−σ
1− σ
, (1)
1Some selective examples of recent influential contributions include Iacoviello (2005), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), Christiano et al. (2010), Karadi and Gertler (2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), and Jermann and
Quadrini (2012).
2Leverage ratios of US commercial banks at the center of the crisis were in the range of 15-20, those of US
investment banks around 25-30 (CGFS (2009)).
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where CIit is consumption of a homogenous final good, σ the coefficient of relative risk
aversion and βIi investor i’s discount factor. The budget constraint reads:
CIit + qi,tK
Ii
i,t = L
IiW Iit + (qi,t +RKi,t)K
Ii
i,t−1 +B
Ii
i,t −Ri,t−1B
Ii
i,t−1. (2)
KIii,t is holdings of a type-i fixed asset, qi,t the asset price, RKi,t the return the asset earns,
W Iit is wage income, L
Ii her (inelastically supplied) labor input, BIii,t is debt issued to savers,
and Ri,t−1B
Ii
i,t−1 the payment on previously incurred debt. Investors also face a constraint
on total leverage due to an inability to commit to repayment. Total debt of investor i is
restricted to be no greater than κi times the market value of her assets, where κi < 1:
BIii,t ≤ κiqi,tK
Ii
it . (3)
Borrowing constraint parameters κi differ across investors, because investors hold different
types of capital, which are collateralizable to different degrees. In addition, lenders’ liquidation
technologies w.r.t. different investors may differ, because informational asymmetries may be
differently strongly pronounced. The first-order conditions of investor i’s optimal choice of
asset holdings, KIii,t, and borrowing, B
Ii
i,t, are(
CIit
)−σ
= βIiEt
[(
CIit+1
)−σ]
Ri,t + µ
Ii
t , (4)
qi,t
(
CIit
)−σ
= βIiEt
[(
CIit+1
)−σ
(qi,t+1 +RKi,t+1)
]
+ µIit qi,t. (5)
Variable µIit represents the shadow value of relaxing the leverage constraint by one unit.
When µIit > 0, the expected return on the asset exceeds the cost of borrowing, and the
collateral constraint (3) holds with equality (resulting from the Kuhn-Tucker condition).3
2.2 Savers
There is a representative saver, of measure 1, with preferences:
Et
∞∑
s=t
(
βS
)s (CSt )1−σ
1− σ
, (6)
where CSt and β
S are the saver’s consumption and discount factor, respectively. Savers
are more patient than investors, so that βS > βIi , ∀ i. The saver maximizes (6) subject to:
CSs +
∑
i
(
BSis −Ris−1B
S
is−1
)
+
∑
i
qisK
S
is = L
SW Ss +
∑
i
qisK
S
is−1 +G
(
KSs−1
)
. (7)
3The assumption that investors are more impatient guarantees that investors’ leverage constraints hold
with equality at the deterministic steady-state. In a stochastic world, this is not necessarily the case, for
example, when investors have strong precautionary motives. We follow a large literature, in assuming that the
constraint always binds – which, with small shock volatility and a sufficiently low investors’ discount factor, is
likely.
We realize that our proposed model is too stylized in some dimensions. E.g., it is unrealistic to assume
that all US non-financial firms are constrained. It would be possible to introduce a fraction of firms that are
unconstrained. Similarly, we assume only short-term (one-period) debt, whereas in reality firms may become
constrained, because they took on long-term debt under more optimistic lending conditions. All these are
possible interesting avenues for future research.
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KSis denotes the saver’s holdings of type-i fixed assets, and −B
S
is denotes lending to the
i’th investor. The saver obtains wage W St on her (inelastically supplied) labor. The saver
uses all i-types of fixed assets, KSis−1, as inputs into a backyard production function, given by
Y St = G
(
KSs−1
)
= Z
(
KSt−1
)ω
, with G′
(
KSs−1
)
> 0 and G′′
(
KSs−1
)
< 0. The saver’s aggregate
fixed asset holdings are modeled as a CES-composite of the individual i-types of fixed assets,
with substitution elastiticity θ:
KSt =
[∑
i
n
1
θ
i
(
KSi,t
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
. (8)
The saver’s first-order conditions for optimal choices of KSis and B
S
is, ∀ i, are given by:(
CSt
)−σ
= βSEt
[(
CSt+1
)−σ]
Ri,t, (9)
qi,t
(
CSt
)−σ
= βSEt

(CSt+1)−σ

qi,t+1 + ωZ (KSt−1)(ω−1) n
1
θ
i
(
KSi,t−1
)−1
θ
(
KSt−1
)− 1
θ



 . (10)
2.3 Firms
Final good firms produce using labor and the fixed asset with standard production function,
Y It = AtL
ε
(
KIt−1
)ε
. At is productivity. Aggregate employment L is constant (because of our
assumption of inelastic labor supply) and normalized to 1. KIt−1 is a CES-composite of the
individual i-types of assets of investors i:
KIt =
[∑
i
n
1
θ
i
(
KIiit
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
, (11)
First-order conditions give:
Wt = (1− ε)At
(
KIt
)ε−1
, (12)
RKi,t = εAt
(
KIt
)(ε−1) n 1θi
(
KIit
)−1
θ
(
KIt
)− 1
θ
. (13)
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the markets for labor, fixed assets, and debt implies:∑
i
LIi + LS = L ≡ 1, (14)
KIii,t +K
S
i,t = ni, i = 1, ...I, (15)
BIii,t +B
S
i,t = 0, i = 1, ...I, (16)
The resource constraint is:∑
i
CIit + C
S
t = AtL
ε
(
KIt−1
)ε
+G
(
KSt−1
)
. (17)
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3 Parameterization
Table 1 summarizes parameter values. To save space, the table provides references used
for the specification of conventional parameters. For less conventional parameters, e.g. the
substitution elasticities of the i-types of capital, θ, we will provide sensitivity analysis. Z,
the productivity in the backyard production sector, is set such that investors hold 80% of
fixed assets at steady-state. The main novelty of our paper is to take seriously the large
heterogeneity in investors’ leverage ratios. We consider I = 5 and calibrate parameters κi, for
i = 1, ..5, to match the 90, 70, 50, 30, and 10-th percentiles of the distribution of debt ratios
(measured as total debt to total assets at book value4) of US non-financial firms, using the
dataset of Rauh and Sufi (2010). This dataset contains 2453 public US non-financial firms,
for the period of 1996-2006. Each investor’s size is then given by ni = 1/5. The leverage
ratios (assets-to-net worth) corresponding to κi, for i = 1, ..5, are given by
1
1−κi
, which are
6.45, 2.54, 1.92, 1.51, and 1.11.
Parameter Value
Discount factor, savers βS 0.99
Discount factor, investors βIi 0.97
Risk aversion σ 2.00
Productivity, autocor. ρA 0.9 Perri and Quadrini (1991)
Productivity, shock vol. σA 0.005 Perri and Quadrini (1991)
Formal production ǫ 0.39 Young et al. (2010)
Informal production ω 0.08 Benhabib et al. (1991)
Labor share, savers lS = L
S
∑
i
LIi+LS
0.8
Substitution elasticity, CES θ 5
Size of i-type capital, CES ni 1/I=1/5
Constr., heterogen. invest. κ1,κ2,κ3,κ4,κ5 0.84,0.61,0.48,0.34,0.10
Constr., homogen. invest. κi, i = 1, ...5 0.48
Table 1: Parameters
4 Results
We present impulse responses for two model versions: in the first, all investors I face the same
leverage constraint, i.e. κi = , ∀ i. This is identical to a model version of a representative, or
average investor, as commonly used in the literature. We refer to this as the ’homogeneous
investors’ case. Our alternative model version, called ’heterogeneous investors’ case, allows
our investors i = 1, ...I to differ in their ability to borrow from collateral.
Figure 1 presents impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease for the case of ’homo-
geneous investors’. The reduced productivity in formal production reduces wages for both
investors and savers, and, because the fall is persistent, reduces the return on investment in
the fixed assets for investors. These effects imply a fall in the price of the fixed asset (panel
D), which causes a tightening of leverage constraints and leads investors to decrease their
borrowing (panel E). Panel A of figure 1 shows that total output, Yt, the sum of formal and
4Alternatively, one could use debt to the market value of assets. The values for the quintiles of this measure
are somewhat lower: κ1 = 0.54, κ2 = 0.34, κ3 = 0.24, κ4 = 0.14, κ5 = 0.02.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease, model with homogeneous in-
vestors.
backyard production, falls. Output in the formal sector, Y It , declines both because of the
direct effect of lower productivity, but also because in response to lower borrowing investors
can now finance less of their holdings of fixed assets. Investors reduce their holdings of the
fixed asset (panel F), which was used in final good sector. Since more of the fixed asset is al-
located to backyard production, Y St , increases, but this increase is not enough to compensate
the fall in Y It . The binding leverage constraint thus leads to an additional dip in output in
period 2. Because both savers and investors have temporarily lower consumption (panel B),
they reduce their savings. However, investors reduce their demand for investment funds even
more strongly, since the tightening of leverage constraints forces them to reduce their total
borrowing to finance investment. With binding constraints the drop in demand thus exceeds
the drop in the supply of funds, and the real interest rate must fall (panel C).
Figure 2 presents impulse responses for the case of heterogeneous investors. Qualitatively,
the behavior of economic variables is similar as before. But quantitatively the responses differ
markedly. Investor 1, the most levered investor, has to sharply decrease her borrowing and,
as a result, her holdings of the fixed asset, by 23.44% and 19.68% respectively. The asset
price corresponding to investor 1’s fixed assets drops by almost 5.49% at peak – because of
the high leverage ratio this constitutes a much more pronounced asset price drop than in
the ’homogeneous investors’ version. Because asset prices of different types of capital are
tightly linked to each other via savers’ intertemporal optimality conditions, they experience
similarly pronounced declines. The (CES-based) aggregate asset price index now falls by
3.35% at peak, compared to the more moderate drop of 2.13% in the model version with
homogeneous investors. The stronger asset prices declines, in turn, lead to a more substantial
tightening of financial constraints also for the other, less levered, investors.5 This translates
5Even though in a very different framework, the idea that asset prices are driven not by the average investor
(but the marginal investor) features prominently in the work of John Geanakoplos (see, e.g. Geanakoplos
(2009)). In our setup asset prices are driven primarily by the agents with the highest leverage.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease, model with heterogeneous in-
vestors.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1% productivity decrease, sensitivity analysis.
into an additional financial amplification compared to the model version where investors are
identical, even though on average leverage constraints are not more severe: output in the
economy drops, at peak, by 2.17% in our model version with investors who are heterogeneous
in their ability to borrow, compared to just 1.20% in the model version with homogeneous
investors.
Figure 3 presents sensitivity analysis of our findings, focusing on the impulse response
of total output. Panel A demonstrates that a higher share of labor supply coming from
savers, lS, means that investors have less resources from which to finance their acquisition of
capital – thus they are less constrained, and financial amplification is smaller. Panel B varies
the substitution elasticity with which different types of fixed assets are aggregated in the
CES-composite. A higher elasticity between varieties of capital implies higher amplification.
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5 Conclusion
We have presented a simple modification to a stylized Kiyotaki-Moore style model with collat-
eral constraints: allowing for multiple types of investors, each of which has a different ability
to borrow from collateral, calibrated to match the means of the quintiles of the distribution of
leverage ratios of US non-financial firms. We find that in such extension, the financial amplifi-
cation and acceleration mechanism may be orders of magnitude stronger. Such modifications
can be relevant also when using models of financial frictions for the study of economic policy.
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